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Abstract
In this paper, we translate a model of value-based emo-
tional agents into an architecture for narrative characters
and we validate it in a narrative scenario. The advantage
of using such model is that different moral behaviors
can be obtained as a consequence of the emotional ap-
praisal of moral values, a desirable feature for digital
storytelling techniques.
Introduction
In recent years, research in interactive narrative has tackled
the moral aspect of stories under different perspectives,
including moral conflicts and dilemmas (Ware 2011;
Barber and Kudenko 2009; Battaglino and Damiano 2012).
The works cited above, however, address the role of moral
values in stories from the perspective of plot generation.
Here, we take a complementary approach and introduce
characters with moral emotions, who are able to react to the
moral valence of the events occurring in a story by “feeling”
the appropriate emotions.
Related Work
Many researchers tried to integrate computational models of
emotions in a cognitive architecture for intelligent agents
(of which (Reilly and Bates 1992; Elliott 1992; Marsella,
Gratch, and Petta 2010) are some examples), with the aim of
inserting emotions in BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) agents
(Bratman 1987). Moral emotions (e.g. Pride, Shame) (Haidt
2003) have received less attention: in most computational
models (Marsella, Gratch, and Petta 2010) emotions are re-
lated to a desirability/undesirability of situations with re-
spect to goals.
A few works address moral emotions related to norm vio-
lation by casting norm violation as goal violation (Gratch,
Mao, and Marsella 2006) or modeling norm violation in a
domain specific way, thus lacking of flexibility (Si, Marsella,
and Pynadath 2010; Bulitko et al. 2008). Regarding norms,
one of the few exceptions to the trend of focusing on goal-
related emotions is the work by Ferreira et al. (Ferreira et
al. 2013). Despite being able to generate moral emotions,
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this work focuses on the use of domain-specific cultural and
social norms (e.g. not smoking in a bar) which are usually
shared across a set of individuals. In our approach, we fo-
cus on the more generic concept of individual moral values,
which can be easily adapted to new situations. Moreover,
the work by Ferreira does not address the question of how to
use the moral appraisals/emotions to guide decision-making,
which is a core aspect of the model we propose.
In this work, we avail ourselves of the OCC model and
rely on previous work by (Battaglino, Damiano, and Lesmo
2013) to establish an explicit link between moral values
and moral emotions. The agent is endowed with an explicit
moral dimension formed by a scale of moral values (such as
“honesty”, “freedom”) (Fraassen 1973).
A model for characters with moral emotions
Following (Battaglino, Damiano, and Lesmo 2013), agents
have an explicit representation of their moral dimension
based on a value system (Fraassen 1973), and a motivational
dimension given by the desires they want to pursue (Bratman
1987). According to cognitive theories of emotions (Ortony,
Clore, and Collins 1988), values and desires mediate the re-
lation between the agent and the environment through the
notion of appraisal.
We integrated the model presented in (Battaglino, Damiano,
and Lesmo 2013) into the FAtiMA (Fearnot AffecTIve Mind
Architecture) architecture (Dias, Mascarenhas, and Paiva
2011), developing a new component called Value Compo-
nent. FAtiMA is an emotional agent architecture composed
of a core layer (named FAtiMA Core) on which particular
components can be easily added in order to add new func-
tionalities. FAtiMA Core is a template that generally defines
how an Agent Architecture with emotions works.
The Value Component generates the appraisal variables
based on goals and values processing. The appraisal of
events as desirable or undesirable depends on the process-
ing of goals. A desirability (undesirability) variable is gen-
erated when a goal is achieved (unachieved) in the state of
the world. The appraisal of actions is based on the process-
ing of values, the appraisal derivation model generates a
praiseworthiness (blameworthiness) variable when a value
is balanced (put at stake) in the state of the world. Given the
appraisal variables, the OCC Affect Derivation Component
generates emotions from the appraisal variables, following
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the OCC theory of emotions (Ortony, Clore, and Collins
1988) (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Appraisal and Affect Derivation model in
(Battaglino, Damiano, and Lesmo 2013)
We also implement in the Value Component the “Antici-
patory Emotional Appraisal” phase presented in (Battaglino,
Damiano, and Lesmo 2013) in which moral emotions are in-
tegrated in the deliberation process of the agent which are
driven by moral emotions (e.g. Shame, Pride, etc.) in choos-
ing a course of action congruent with their moral values.
Agents rely on moral values also to evaluate the behavior
of the others, feeling emotions like Reproach or Anger. So,
Boo won’t steal the candy, at least unless she is very hungry.
And, if she does, she will still feel Shame.
Emotional appraisal is conducted by assessing the conse-
quences of these plans on the agent’s goals and values in
order to assess possible conflicts. The overall plan utility,
based on emotional reward, is computed as:
EER = (EERJ + EERP )− (EERS + EERD) (1)
whereEERJ (EERD) is the intensity that the agent feels if
the considered plan π achieves (doesn’t achieve) some goals
of the agent (we noted with GA the set of individual goal
satisfied by the plan π and with GT the set of individual
goals threatened):
EERJ(GA, πi) =
P (πi) ∗
∑
ga∈GA
ImpOfS(ga)
E(πi)
(2)
EERD(GT , πi) =
P (πi) ∗
∑
gt∈GT
ImpOfF (gt)
E(πi)
(3)
and EERP (EERS) is the intensity that the agent feels if
the considered plan π balances (threatens) some values of
the agent (we noted with VB the set of values re-established
and with VT the set of values put at stake):
EERP (VB , πi) =
P (πi) ∗
∑
vb∈VB
(r(vb))
E(πi)
(4)
EERS(VT , πi) =
P (πi) ∗
∑
tt∈VT
(r(vt))
E(πi)
(5)
For example, Boo has the goal to eat a chocolate candy. In
order to satisfy her goal, the chocolate candy must be stolen
from Mary but the steal action makes the violation condi-
tion of the value honesty true. So, if Boo executes her plan,
the emotional reward utility will derive from the Joy inten-
sity and the Shame intensity. Let us consider another plan,
in which Boo asks Mary to give her the chocolate candy. In
this case no value is put at stake and the emotional reward
utility will derive from the Joy intensity only. If the value
honesty is very important for Boo, she chooses the plan to
ask Mary the chocolate candy, even if the plan has a lower
probability of success. Summarizing, the Value Component
adds to the FAtiMA Core the following capabilities: 1) the
monitoring of values are put at stake or re-balanced (2) the
generation, in the appraisal phase, of the appraisal variables
praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, desirability and unde-
sirability based on desires and values (3) the calculation of
the expected emotional reward of plans based on values re-
balanced and put at stake and goals achieved or not achieved.
Example
In this section, we rely on a simple narrative scenario to
illustrate how the agent architecture, presented in this paper,
allows characters to generate moral emotions in response to
events and take decisions based on their moral values.
Consider three characters, Mary, Boo and Charlie. Mary
has a chocolate candy that she wants to give to her
friend Tom (give(chocolateCandy, Tom)). Charlie and
Boo are very hungry; they want Mary’s chocolate candy
(eat(chocolateCandy) and they can choose between differ-
ent courses of action to achieve the desire: they can ask
Mary for the chocolate or they can steal it. Their choice
depends on the Emotional Expected Reward (EER) utility of
their plans. Mary, Boo and Charlie own the value “honesty”,
but the priority of the value for Charlie is very low while for
Mary and Boo is high (Figure 2).
In their reasoning cycle, both Charlie and Boo adopt
Figure 2: Characters’ authoring data. plans probability range
is in [0;1]; other elements are in [0;10]. See(Dias and Paiva
2005; Battaglino, Damiano, and Lesmo 2013) for details.
the goal eat(chocolateCandy) and it becomes the current
intention of the agent (being the only goal, it doesn’t
compete with any other goals). Charlie and Boo find two
plans that satisfy the intention: the πSteal plan and the πAsk
plan. The plan πSteal contains the steal action and the eat
action. The steal action has the effect of putting at stake
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Figure 3: Characters’ emotional state.
the value “honesty” and of obtaining the chocolate candy,
while the ask action has the effect of obtaining the chocolate
candy, without putting at stake any values. The ask action
has a lower chance of realizing its effects, so the plan πAsk
has a less probability of success than the planπSteal. In the
anticipatory emotional appraisal, Boo and Charlie calculate
the Expected Emotional Reward utility for their plans. The
plan πSteal satisfies the goal of eating a chocolate candy
and puts at stake the value “honesty”. The EER depends
on the Joy that Charlie and Boo will feel if they achieve
the goal eat(chocolateCandy) and on the Shame that they
will feel if they put at stake the value “honesty” (Figure 2),
following the formulas presented in Section . The EER of
the plan πAsk depends on the Joy that they will feel if they
eat the chocolate candy (Figure 2). Due to the different EER
calculated during the anticipatory appraisal phase, Charlie
and Boo prefer different plans:
Boo: despite the lower probability of success, Boo prefers
the plans πAsk because she owns the value “honesty” with
an high priority (Figure 2). Boo starts to execute her plan,
and asks Mary the chocolate candy. Mary answer that she
wants give it to Tom, so Boo feels Distress emotion because
her desire is not fulfilled (Figure 3).
Charlie: he prefers the plan πSteal. Charlie owns the
value “honesty” with a low priority and he prefers to
execute the plan with the higher probability of success,
despite the consequences of putting the value “honesty”
at stake (Figure 2). After executing the plan with success,
Charlie feels a Shame emotion with a very low intensity and
a Joy emotion with an high intensity because his desire is
fulfilled (Figure 3).
Mary: during her reasoning cycle, Mary appraises the ac-
tion Steal performed by Charlie as blameworthy because
the action puts at stake her value “honesty”. At the same
time, the plan executed by Charlie makes the Mary’s goal
give(chocolateCandy, Tom) unsatisfied and Mary feels a
strong Anger (Reproach and Distress) emotion towards
Charlie (Figure 3). The strong Anger emotion triggers
Mary’s action tendency to yell at Charlie.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the implementation of value-
sensitive emotional characters in an architecture for narra-
tive characters (Dias, Mascarenhas, and Paiva 2011). Our
work relies on previous work by (Battaglino, Damiano, and
Lesmo 2013) and extends it by showing the feasibility of the
model in a practical architecture, by validating it in a simple
narrative scenario.
The validation shows how emotions can lead different char-
acters, posited in the same narrative situation, to choose dif-
ferent courses of actions as a consequence of the compliance
with different values, which lead then to experience different
emotional states. An important advantage is that the charac-
ters not only feel moral emotions, such as Shame or Anger,
but these emotions are involved in the characters’ deliber-
ation process. The implication for narrative technologies is
a gain in terms of characters’ believability, with the possi-
bility of modeling not only the visible effects of the emo-
tional states but also the introspective process occurring in
the characters’ mind, that is an intrinsic feature of literaly
narration. Moreover, the implemented model incorporated
domain-independent rules for emotion generation and action
selection, a desirable feature for the authoring of new char-
acters.
In the future we plan to test our work in more complex narra-
tive scenarios, taken from real literaly works and validate the
predicted emotional states and behaviors with human users.
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